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THE STATUTORY REGULATION OF INHERITANCE 
BY NONRESIDENT ALIENS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The right of a nonresident alien to take real or personal property 
through testamentary bequest or intestate succession is regulated in this 
country by the laws of the states in which the property is located or the 
estate is probated. Many of the individual states of the Union demand that 
a potential foreign beneficiary establish, as a condition precedent to receipt 
of his inheritance share, compliance with an established statutory scheme. 
Often these regulatory measures require the existence of circumstances 
over which the alien, as an individual, has no, or at best minimal, control. 
The nonresident alien's ability to take and enjoy his inheritance is fre-
quently contingent upon satisfactory proof of the conformity of his nation's 
legal system or, more difficultly, its political ideology and economic struc-
ture, to the statutory requirements.1 As written and applied by the courts 
the disparate requirements of these statutes impose critical obstacles to 
inheritance by nonresident aliens. Further, they serve to thwart the evident 
testamentary design of a decedent, and occasion severe problems in estate 
administration. An exposition and analysis of these various statutes will 
be attempted in this comment. 
Such an endeavor must be premised on two basic propositions. First, 
there is no natural, inherent right to inherit; absent a constitutional or 
statutory fiat there can be no inheritance by a citizen or alien.2 Second, 
these various restraints upon the nonresident alien's right to inherit, though 
products of political and social bias rather than legal values,3 are, in the 
absence of a treaty or overriding federal policy such as war, a valid exer-
cise of the states' authority.4 It therefore may be presumptuous to criticize 
1. These restrictions on inheritance are generally considered in relation to the 
contemporary world situation vis-a-vis Nazi Germany and the Communist dominated 
nations. It may be noted that the right of the nonresident alien Dennis Martin to 
inherit lands in Virginia gave rise to the constitutional conflict in Martin v. Hunter's 
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). The constitutional right of the states to 
enact such measures is considered in Boyd, The Invalidity of State Statutes Governing 
the Share of Non Resident Aliens in Decedents' Estates, 51 G~<;o. L.J. 470, 480-509 
(1963). 
2. "Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a State to 
limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property 
within its jurisdiction.'' Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1941). 
3. E.g., Estate of Gogabashvele, 195 Cal. App. 2d 503, 16 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1961) ; 
In re Estate of Ginn, 136 Mont. 336, 347 P.2d 467 (1959) ; In re Estate of Spoya, 
129 Mont. 83, 282 P.2d 452 (1955) ; First Nat'! Bank v. Fishman, 7 Ohio Misc. 130, 
217 N.E.2d 60 (1966). 
4. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947). The state courts unanimously support 
this proposition. E.g., Estate of Reihs, 102 Cal. App. 2d 260, 227 P.2d 564 (1951); 
Lazarou v. Moraros, 101 N.H. 383, 143 A.2d 669 (1958); Stoich v. Kolovrat, 220 
Ore. 448, 349 P.2d 255 (1961), rev'd sub nom., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 
(1961); Belemecich Estate, 411 Pa. 506, 192 A.2d 740 (1963), rev'd sub tlom., Consul 
General of Yugoslavia at Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania, 375 U.S. 395 (1964). 
Such restrictions placed upon the alien's right to inherit do not constitute a 
violation of international law. 1 C. HYDJ<;, INTERNATIONAL LAW 203 (rev. ed. 1947). 
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the restrictions imposed by the states. For they, in the legitimate exercise 
of their constitutional prerogative, may place any restrictions upon the 
nonresident alien's right to inherit which they deem appropriate. The due 
process requirements of the fourteenth amendment as applied to nonresi-
dent aliens are minimal. 
The common law disabilities to which aliens were subject form the 
historical basis of the statutes to be investigated. The fear of foreigners 
and national considerations of defense and foreign policy were the justifica-
tions assigned to the medieval limitations placed on an alien's right to 
inherit and hold land.5 Among his other disabilities, an alien could only 
hold land subject to divestiture by the Crown through a proceeding of 
"inquest for office found." He had no capacity to succeed to realty by 
intestate succession; alienage did not confer any inheritible blood. 6 Though 
these concepts were incorporated into the common law of the several states, 
they have been modified over the past two centuries by constitutional 
provision or statute. Indeed, many of the states have completely abolished 
all of the general restrictions on alien ownership of land. 7 Despite this 
liberalization, however, some states have enacted specific measures which 
severely qualify the nonresident alien's right to inheritance proceeds, or 
inhibit his receipt thereof. 
These repressive statutes are of two basic types. California and other 
western states have enacted "reciprocal right of inheritance" statutes. In 
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and other northeastern states the 
"use, benefit, and control" or "Iron Curtain" statutes are in force. 
In general, customary practices among nations comprise, in addition to treaties, the 
corpus of international law. The nations of the world have reserved as an attribute 
of their sovereignty the right to regulate inheritance rights. Though in fact, the 
United States is the only western nation imposing such restrictions. Berman, Soviet 
Heir in America1~ Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 257, 263 (1962). See generally Boyd, 
The Invalidity of State Statutes Governing the Share of Non Resident Aliens i1t 
Decedents' Estates, 51 GEo. L.J. 470 (1963) ; Boyd, Treaties Governing The Suc-
cession to Real Property by Aliens, 51 MICH. L. REv. 1001 (1953); Meekison, Treaty 
Provisions For the Inheritance of Personal Property, 44 AM. J. lNT'L L. 313 (1950). 
Section 165 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1962), provides in part: 
(1) Conduct attributable to a state and causing injury to any alien is wrongful 
under international law if it 
(a) departs from the international standard of justice, ... 
(2) The. i~t~~national standard of justice specified in Subsection (1) is the 
standard required for the treatment of aliens by 
(a) The applicable principles of international law as established by 
international custom. . . . 
5. Lord Coke stated in Calvin's Case, 17 Eng. Rep. 377, 399 (K.B. 1607), that 
inheritance by aliens "tends to destruction tempore belli; for then strangers might 
fortify themselves in the heart of the realm and be ready to set fire to the common-
wealth." Likewise Blackstone admonished that since aliens did not owe allegiance to 
the crown "the defense of the Kingdom would have been defeated" by allowing them 
to inherit. 1 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 372. See, Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 
128 N.E. 185, cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920). 
6. Boyd, Treaties Governing The Succession To Real Property By Aliens, supra 
note 4, at 1001-05; 2 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 293. 
7. See Sullivan, Alien Land Laws: A Re-evaluation, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 15 (1962). 
See generally Note, 56 YALE L.J. 1017 (1947). 
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II. RECIPROCITY STATUTES 
In Arizona,s California,0 Iowa,IO Montana,11 Nevada,12 North Caro-
lina,13 Oregon,14 Oklahoma,l5 and Wyoming,16 the right of a nonresident 
alien to take a legacy or bequest is contingent upon the grant by the 
domestic laws of the alien's nation of a like right to a citizen of the United 
States. Section 259 of the California Probate Code, the prototype of the 
reciprocal rights restriction, provides: 
The right of aliens not residing within the United States or its terri-
tories to take real [and personal] property in this state by succession 
or testamentary disposition, upon the same terms and conditions as 
residents and citizens of the United States is dependent in each case 
upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of 
the United States to take real [and personal] property upon the same 
terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the respective coun-
tries of which such aliens are residents .... 
259.1 The burden shall be upon such nonresident aliens to estab-
lish the fact or existence of the reciprocal rights set forth 
in Section 259. 
259.2 If such reciprocal rights are not found to exist and if no 
heirs other than such aliens are found eligible to take such 
property, the property shall be disposed of as escheated 
property. 
Enacted shortly before World War II and originally employed against 
the totalitarian regimes of Germany and Italy, these measures now thwart 
inheritance by nationals of Communist bloc states. By their terms, how-
ever, they are capable of a more general application. The legislative pur-
pose of such enactments evinces Lord Coke's "Trojan Horse"17 fear. The 
California court stated in Estate of Karban that: 
[M]oney left by California decedents to relatives in those countries 
[engaged in or contemplating war with the United States] did not 
reach them, but was used by their governments . . . property and 
money of persons dying in this country should remain here and not 
be sent to foreign countries and be used in waging a war ... against 
the United States.1s 
8. ARIZ. RJ>v. StAt. ANN. § 14-212(c) (1956). 
9. CAL. PROB. CoDE§ 259 (West 1956). 
10. IowA Con~>§ 567.8 (Supp. 1966). 
11. MoNT. REv. ConE ANN. § 91-520 (1964). 
12. NEv. REV. STA'l'. §§ 134.230--134.250 (1966). 
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 64-3 (1966). 
14. ORE. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1965). 
15. OKLA. STAT., tit. 60, § 121 (1963). 
16. WYo. STA'l'. ANN.§ 2-43.1 (Supp. 1965). 
17. See note 5, supra. 
18. 118 Cal. APJ?· 2d 240, 244, 257 P.2d 649, 652 (1953) ; Chaitkin, The Rights 
of Residents of Russta and Its Satellites to Share in Estates of American Decedents, 
25 S. CAL. L. REv. 297 (1952). 
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The construction of these statutes is logically difficult to justify. These 
measures assure alien beneficiaries, even if their governments are hostile 
to the United States, the absolute right to receive the proceeds from an 
inheritance. Such a concession is conditioned only upon the grant by the 
domestic law of the foreign nation of the same inheritance rights to Ameri-
can citizens as are enjoyed by its own nationals. Conceivably, even a 
negligible or nonexistent right of inheritance, if shared equally by United 
States citizens and the native population, would secure full inheritance 
rights here by residents of that country.19 
A. Differing Concepts of Reciprocity 
Though classified together generically, when examined individually 
these reciprocal rights statutes exhibit marked dissimilarity. The distinct-
tions arise in the various interpretations given to the term "reciprocity" 
itself. 
Despite the general use of the California statute as the reciprocity 
prototype, only the statutes of Iowa and North Carolina join California 
in the liberal and somewhat illogical approach that reciprocity exists when-
ever nationals of the foreign country and citizens of the United States 
enjoy equal inheritance rights in the alien's own nation. The court in 
Estate of Miller20 stated that section 259 of the California Probate Code 
does not demand of a foreign country a legal system identical to ours. "All 
that it requires is that there be no discrimination shown in inheritance 
matters between nationals of that country and residents and citizens of 
our own. . .. "21 By this conception of reciprocity a nonresident alien is 
assured absolute equality of inheritance rights with Americans here if the 
domestic inheritance laws of the alien's country apply equally to its own 
nationals and United States citizens. 
Recognizing the literal and logical deficiency of section 259, the 
California Supreme Court has recently interjected into its interpretation a 
totally new concept. Although with no statutory foundation, Mr. Justice 
Tobriner speaking for the majority in Estate of Larkin stated that: 
Though section 259 requires only the demonstration of a "recipro-
cal right" on the part of our citizens "to take property upon the same 
terms and conditions" as residents of the foreign country itself, we 
doubt that mere equality of treatment would suffice. We would almost 
certainly not find the requisite reciprocity with respect to a country 
which permitted no inheritance at all, or which made the enforcement 
of inheritance subject to official whim or caprice. Though the statute 
speaks in terms of equal treatment, we believe that it necessarily 
19. Nazi Germany was cognizant of this fact and took advantage of it. See 
Estate of Schluttig, 36 Cal. 2d 416, 224 P.2d 695 (1950). 
20. 104 Cal. App. 2d 1, 230 P.Zd 667 (1951). See also Estate of Kennedy, 106 
Cal. App. 2d 621, 235 P.2d 837 (1951) ; Estate of Reihs, 102 Cal. App. 2d 260, 227 
P.2d 564 (1951); Corbett v. Stergios, 256 Iowa 12, 126 N.W.2d 342 (Iowa 1964), 
rev'd per curiam, 381 U.S. 124 (1965). 
21. Estate of Miller, 104 Cal. App. 2d at 12, 230 P.2d at 674. 
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imports a requirement that the inheritance rights recognized in the 
foreign country meet some minimal standard of economic substan-
tiality, and that it be shown that such rights are regularly recognized 
in practice.22 
This purely judicial definition of reciprocity may require something more 
than mere equality of treatment. By its terms, a nonresident alien is granted 
inheritance rights in this country equal to those enjoyed by United States 
citizens only if an American can inherit an "economically substantial 
interest" in the alien's nation. Thus, in contradiction to the statutory 
language, more favorable treatment may be required for an American than 
is accorded the national population by the domestic laws of the alien's 
country; there is no requirement that the local citizenry also be permitted 
to inherit such "economically substantial interests." Apparently such a 
determination of economic substantiality will be made on an ad hoc, case 
by case basis. The interesting question posed by this test has not yet 
been answered - "economically substantial interests" by whose standards, 
American or those of the alien's nation.23 
While reading the statute more conservatively in this one respect, 
Larkin also overruled a narrow interpretation of reciprocal rights which, 
if followed, would have effectively denied inheritance to all residents of 
Communist controlled countries. A lower appellate court had ruled in 
Estate of Gogabashvele24 that no reciprocal rights of inheritance existed 
between the United States and the Soviet Union since an American or 
Soviet citizen has no "right" or legally enforceable claim to inheritance 
in Russia. When the government grants only a conditional privilege of 
inheritance subject to unbridled discretion there is, held the court, no 
reciprocal "right" as the term is employed in section 259.25 The Larkin 
court emphasized the notion that there is no natural right to inherit, even 
in this country.26 And after an extensive review and recitation of the 
evidence it was determined by the court that Soviet citizens do in fact 
enjoy substantial inheritance benefits, and that Americans share these 
benefits on a nondiscriminatory basis. The ability of the Russian govern-
22. 65 Cal. 2d 60, 65, 416 P.2d 473, 476, 52 Cal. Rptr. 441, 442 (1966), noted in 
80 HARV. L. Rsv. 675 (1967). Justice Tobriner reasserted this "economic substan-
tiality" test in Estate of Chichernea, 66 Cal. 2d 74, 424 P.2d 687, 57 Cal. Rptr. 135 
(1967). In this case it was conceded, however, that Larkin does not demand that one 
inheriting such an economically substantial interest also have the absolute right to 
remove the proceeds to his country. Proof that a nation denies in practice the equal 
inheritance rights it professes in theory was sufficient to yield a finding of no reciprocity 
in Estate of Schluttig, 36 Cal. 2d 416, 224 P.2d 695 (1950). 
23. The court in Larkin apparently assumed, without deciding, that Americans 
have inherited in Russia economically substantial interests. 
24. 191 Cal. App. 2d 503, 16 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1961). 
25. This decision produced a spate of articles all demonstrating that Soviet citi-
zens do in fact enjoy substantial inheritance rights. Bader, et al., Soviet Inheritance 
Cases in American Courts and The Soviet Property Regime, 1966 DuKE L.J. 98; 
Ginsburgs, Inheritance by Foreigners Under Soviet Law, 51 IowA L. Rsv. 16 (1965); 
Berman, Soviet Heirs In American Courts, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 257 (1962). 
26. Estate of Larkin, 65 Cal. 2d 60, 80, 416 P.2d 473, 487, 52 Cal. Rptr. 441, 456, 
quoting Estate of Simmons, 64 Cal. 2d 217, 221, 411 P.2d 97, 100, 49 Cal. Rptr. 369, 
372 (1966). 
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ment to alter this favorable situation was considered to be of no significance 
until utilized in an abusive manner.27 
In contradistinction to the California statutory requirement of equal 
treatment for Americans and the local citizenry in the alien's nation are 
the Arizona and Oklahoma statutes. These measures sanction discrimina-
tion by both the state probate courts and the domestic laws of the alien's 
country. Any alien eligible for citizenship may take real and personal 
property "in the same manner that a citizen of the United States takes 
and holds real and personal property by devise or descent in the country 
of which the alien is a citizen."28 Literally, the courts are empowered to 
award property to nonresident aliens on the same terms, and presumably 
under the same disabilities, as a United States citizen can take in the 
alien's own country. There is, contrary to the California statutory pro-
vision, neither assurance that the alien will take absolutely here nor direc-
tive that he prove equality of treatment abroad. Reciprocity is given a 
rather constrained definition and application by the Arizona and Oklahoma 
statutes. The nonresident alien's inheritance rights in this country are 
equal to, and precisely gauged by, those which are granted in his country 
to an American. There are, therefore, strictly equal inheritance rights 
between the alien here and the United States citizen in the alien's nation. 
Under the language of the California statute, equality of inheritance rights 
between nonresident aliens and citizens here is conditioned upon equality 
between Americans and the citizens of the alien's country. But there is 
no necessity that the right granted here be identical to and based upon 
that enjoyed abroad. The Arizona and Oklahoma definition of reciprocity 
is not equivalent to that expounded in Larkin. There is no requirement, 
in Larkin, that the "economically substantial interest" which an American 
must enjoy abroad be equal to the interest which the alien receives here. 
The older Oregon law29 presents a variant of the Arizona-Oklahoma 
concept. Reciprocity was said to exist if a United States citizen could take 
an estate in the alien's country on the same terms as the laws of that nation 
allowed the alien to take an estate probated here. This notion is also dis-
tinguished from the California law. There is no requirement that Ameri-
cans enjoy complete equality of inheritance rights with the local citizenry. 
27. Although Larkin has clarified the California law on this point, the Oregon 
courts still hold reciprocal "right" to import a legally enforceable claim. State Land 
Board v. Buchanan, 199 Or. 448, 263 P.Zd 769 (1953). See also State v. Pekarek, 
234 Or. 74, 378 P.2d 734 (1963); Stoich v. Kolovrat, 220 Or. 448, 349 P.Zd 255 
(1960), rev'd sub nom., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961). 
28. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-212(c) (1956); see Podret v. Superior Ct., 80 
Ariz. 182, 294 P.2d 670 (1956). In 1965 Texas amended its laws to grant aliens 
complete equality with citizens as regards inheritance rights. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. 
ANN., art. 166A (Supp. 1966). Prior to this enactment the Texas law was iden-
tical to that of Arizona. 
29. Law of March 11, 1937, ch. 399, § 1 [1937] Ore. Laws 1937 (amended 1951). 
This law may still have some vitality, since the statutory requirements to be con-
sidered are those extant at the time of the testator's death, not at the time of probate 
or litigation. Mullart v. State Land Board, 222 Or. 463, 353 P.2d 531 (1960) ; 
Clostermann v. Schmidt, 215 Or. 55, 332 P.2d 1036 (1958); State Land Board v. 
Buchanan, 199 Or. 448, 263 P.2d 769 (1953) ; Note, 45 ORE. L. REV. 221 (1965). 
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Instead, it requires the law of the alien's nation to allow an American to 
inherit an estate there on the same terms as it allows one of its nationals 
to take an estate here. 
The present Oregon statute, as well as the laws of Montana and 
Nevada, compound the California concept of equal treatment of Americans 
and nationals of a foreign country in that nation with the requirement that 
the American have the absolute right to receive payment, in this country 
or its territories, of funds derived from his estate share.30 It means very 
little, said the court in State Land Board v. Rodgers,31 to give the Ameri-
can an equal right to take if the foreign exchange laws frustrate delivery 
of the proceeds in the United States. These statutes, therefore, require 
more favorable treatment for the American under the laws of the alien's 
country than the alien himself may receive. Under the laws of Montana 
and Nevada there is no necessity of concomitant proof that the alien will 
receive the full proceeds of an estate share in his own country. Oregon, 
however, requires, in addition to equal treatment and the unimpaired right 
of an American to receive the proceeds from an inheritance, proof that 
the alien will have the full use, benefit, and control of the funds in his 
own country.32 
B. Burden of Proof 
Without exception, these reciprocity statutes place the onus of estab-
lishing the existence of reciprocal rights upon the potential foreign bene-
ficiary. This arbitrary imposition is based upon the rationale that he is 
in a better position to prove the features of his own nation's law.33 Though 
30. OR!l. R!lv. STAT. § 111.070 (1965): 
(1) The right of an alien not residing within the United States or its terri-
tories to take either real or personal property or the proceeds thereof in 
this state by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the same terms 
and conditions as inhabitants and citizens of the United States, is de-
pendant in each case : 
(b) Upon the rights of citizens of the United States to receive by payment 
to them within the United States or its territories money originating 
from the estates of persons dying within such foreign country .... 
31. 219 Or. 233, 347 P.2d 57 (1959). The argument was advanced in this case 
that the "right to receive payment" requirement could be met by transferring the funds 
from Bulgaria to a bank in a third country, and then drawing on that account in 
this country. The court refused to authorize this procedure stating that the right to 
receive payment in the United States envisions a delivery here of the funds directly 
from someone in the foreign country who is authorized to disburse decedent's estates. 
32. These three requirements make Oregon's inheritance law the most stringent 
in the nation. The Wyoming statute merely states that a nonresident alien will not 
be permitted to inherit an estate here if "the laws of the country of which such non-
resident alien is a citizen do not allow citizens of the United States to take real 
property by succession or by testamentary disposition." WYo. STAT. ANN. § 2-43.1 (a) 
(Supp. 1965). In the absence of any judicial decisions it is difficult to determine how 
this ambiguous phrase will be construed. 
33. Estate of Gaspor, 128 Mont. 383, 275 P.2d 656 (1954). At one time sec-
tion 259 of the California Probate Code cast the burden on the state, or challenging 
party. Proceeding on the assumption that foreign law was the same as that of Cali-
fornia, reciprocity was presumed to exist. Law of July 9, 1945, ch. 1160, § 1 [1945] 
Cal. Laws 1945 (repealed 1947). Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents of Russia and 
Its Satellites to Share in Estates of AmericmJ Decedents, 25 S. CAL. L. REv. 297, 
307-12 (1952). 
FALL 1967] COMMENTS 155 
ostensibly just, such a requirement may be latently inconsistent with the 
accepted norms of procedure. Assume that a testator dies survived by a 
brother in Russia and cousins in this country, and that a bequest of the 
entire estate is made to the brother. Under section 259 of the California 
Probate Code the brother must, before he can take the inheritance, estab-
lish the requisite reciprocity. Should he fail, the property passes to the 
cousins or escheats. It may, in some instances, be improper to demand 
that the brother prove his right to inherit. Normally the moving party, 
he who challenges or alleges, must bear the burden of proof.34 Yet in 
these cases the challenge of the state or a distant relative would thrust the 
affirmative burden of proof on the alien.35 
Reciprocity is to be demonstrated by the alien as a question of fact,36 
despite the proposition found in the evidence law of at least one reciprocity 
jurisdiction that matters of foreign law constitute questions of law con-
cerning which a court may take judicial noticeP This apparent incon-
gruity is justified on the grounds that it is often extremely difficult to 
determine with precision the laws of the countries involved (usually those 
of the Soviet bloc). The court in Estate of Kennedy expressed this 
rationale thusly: 
[Judicial notice] ... extends no further than ... the general system 
of ... [law that] prevails, without taking notice of details .... [T]he 
form of government of that nation gives us no knowledge of the 
"details" of the jurisprudence of that country .... 38 
Furthermore, these statutes require proof not only of the abstract legal prop-
osition, but also of the law's regular and nondiscriminatory application. 
A treaty, however, is regarded as the supreme law of the land. If the 
alien introduces evidence that a treaty containing provisions regulating 
inheritance exists between his nation and the United States, then the 
determination of the alien's right to inherit becomes a question of law.39 
Hence the alien must establish reciprocity either through proof of the 
existence of relevant treaty provisions, or by introducing expert testimony 
as to the law of the foreign nation in question and lay testimony to the 
34. 9 W. WIGMORE, EviDENCE § 2486 (3d ed. 1940). 
35. E.g., Estate of Larkin, 65 Cal. 2d 60, 416 P.2d 473, 52 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1966) ; 
Mullart v. State Land Board, 222 Or. 463, 353 P.2d 531 (1960). 
Concededly, if the case is one in which the nonresident alien is bringing a pro-
ceeding for determination of heirship, then he, as the moving party, should bear the 
burden of proof. Zschernig v. Miller, 243 Or. 567, 412 P.2d 781 (1966) ; prob. juris. 
noted, 386 U.S. 1030 (1967). 
36. Estate of Schneider, 140 Cal. App. 2d 710, 296 P.2d 45 (1956) ; Estate of 
Schluttig, 36 Cal. 2d 416, 224 P.2d 695 (1950). 
37. CAL. Evm. ConE §§ 310, 450 (West 1966). 
38. 107 Cal. App. 2d 621, 626, 235 P.2d 837, 840-41 (1951). Estate of Eng, 228 
Cal. App. 2d 160, 39 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1964), held that judicial notice may be taken 
only of things certain. The precise provisions of foreign law were said to be un-
certain. Also, see Estate of Feierman, 202 Cal. App. 552, 20 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1962). 
39. Estate of Arbulich, 41 Cal. 2d 86, 257 P.2d 433, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897 
(1953) ; Zschernig v. Miller, 243 Or. 567, 412 P.2d 781 (1966) ; Stoich v. Kolovrat, 
220 Or. 448, 349 P.2d 255 (1960), rev'd sub nom., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 
187 (1961). 
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effect that other United States citizens have in fact received bequests from 
estates probated in that country.40 
Since the issue of reciprocity is to be resolved as a question of fact, 
stare decisis is of no assistance to the alien. Consequently, reciprocal 
inheritance rights may be found to exist with a particular nation in one 
case, and not to exist at the same period of time in another.41 And the 
alien's right to inherit often turns upon his ability to acquire persuasive 
expert witnesses.42 
Although repeatedly asserting that reciprocity is to be determined as 
a matter of fact, in cases of this type the appellate courts frequently exceed 
their traditional role. It is not uncommon for them to indulge in a re-
evaluation of the evidence and to make an independent determination of 
the existence vel non of reciprocity on the basis thereof.43 
These reciprocal rights statutes are a matter of substantive law since 
they condition the potential beneficiary's ultimate right to the proceeds of 
the estate. "If a nonresident alien cannot allege and prove reciprocity, he 
may not inherit under our laws."44 Hence, reciprocity, and under the 
Oregon statute the right to receive the proceeds, must be shown to have . 
obtained at the time of the testator's or intestate's death,45 for it is at 
that time that the property conceptually passes to the heir. This notion 
provides the theoretical basis for the wording of the statute - "the right 
to take." The property passes to the nonresident alien on the death of 
the testator. His substantive right to take the inheritance is, however, 
conditioned upon proof of reciprocity. Failure to meet this burden effects 
a divestiture of his interest in the estate and a transfer of it to other heirs 
or the state.46 Curiously, opinions such as Larkin discuss in detail the 
inheritance provisions of the foreign nation's present legal system without 
demonstrating their existence at the time of the testator's death. 
40. In Estate of Ginn, 136 Mont. 338, 347 P.2d 467 (1959), the court rejected the 
contention that the alien could not receive any amount in excess of that previously 
granted without proof of reciprocity for the amount claimed. Once reciprocity is 
proven, said the court, there is no limit to the amount to be received. 
41. Reciprocity was found to exist with Germany on April 22, 1942, Estate of 
Miller, 104 Cal. App. 2d 1, 230 P.2d 667 (1951), but not to exist on June 3, 1943, Estate 
of Thramm, 80 Cal. App. 2d 756, 183 P.2d 97 ( 1947). 
42. Comment, The Application of the Reciprocal Rights and Benefit Rules to 
Foreign Legacies, 36 TuL. L. REv. 799, 811 (1962). 
43. E.g., Estate of Gogabashvele, 195 Cal. App. 2d 503, 16 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1961) ; 
Estate of Spoya, 129 Mont. 83, 282 P.Zd 452 (1955). The dissent in Estate of 
Arbulich, 41 Cal. 2d 86, 257 P.2d 433, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953), stated that 
it is improper to reverse a lower court's finding of fact on the matter of reciprocity 
when it is supported by conflicting evidence. See also Estate of Schulttig, 36 Cal. 
2d 416, 224 P.2d 695 (1950). In State v. Pekarek, 234 Or. 74, 378 P.2d 734 (1963), 
the appellate court evaluated the testimony of Czechoslovakian embassy officials which 
tended to prove that the alien would receive the use, benefit, and control of the pro-
ceeds of an estate as required by OR~. R~v. STAT. § 111.070(c) (1965). Their testi-
mony was found not to be trustworthy. 
44. Estate of Nersisian, 155 Cal. App. 2d 561, 566, 318 P.2d 168, 171 (1957). 
45. E.g., Estate of Arbulich, 41 Cal. 2d 86, 257 P.Zd 433 cert. denied, 346 U.S. 
897 (1953) ; Estate of Spoya, 129 Mont. 83, 282 P.Zd 452 (195S) ; Zschernig v. Miller, 
243 Or. 567, 412 P.Zd 781 (1966). 
46. Estate of Schneider, 140 Cal. App. 2d 710, 296 P.Zd 45 (1956) ; Mullart v. 
State Land Board, 222 Or. 463, 353 P.2d 531 (1960). 
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C. Failure to Comply 
Often the state, seeking to benefit through the escheat provision of 
these statutes, is a party to the dispute. The property escheats, however, 
only as a final alternative. "[I]£ no heirs other than such aliens are found 
eligible to take such property .... "47 it shall escheat. Literally this clause 
appears to authorize disposal of the property in accordance with the state's 
rules of intestate succession. In Estate of Bevilacqua,48 an intestate was 
survived by a wife and children in Italy and remote cousins in this country. 
The wife was unable to prove the requisite reciprocity. It was determined 
by the court that her inability to take did not authorize an escheat of the 
property, but rather it devolved to those next entitled to take as though 
the first heirs had not existed. In Kramer v. Superior Court,49 the testa-
tor's will provided that the residue of his estate should be divided equally 
between his wife, a California resident, and certain other relatives living 
in East Germany. These latter were unable to prove reciprocity. Contrary 
to Bevilacqua, the court ordered an escheat of that portion of the estate 
bequeathed to these relations. Such a holding gives testimony to the fact 
that the courts, in applying these statutes, do not consider as the paramount 
factor the intent of the testator, for it seems unreasonable to assume 
that he would prefer automatic escheat to distribution among alternative 
beneficiaries. 
III. UsE, BENEFIT, AND CoNTROL STATUTES 
In contrast to the reciprocity statutes which substantively condition 
the nonresident alien's right to take an inheritance, Connecticut,5° Florida,51 
Maryland,52 Massachusetts,53 Michigan,54 New Jersey,55 New York,56 
Pennsylvania,57 Ohio, 58 and Rhode Island59 have enacted custodial measures 
designed to control the transmission of estate proceeds to nonresident 
aliens. Section 2218-1 of the New York Surrogate Court Procedure Act, 
the archetype of these statutes, provides: 
Where it shall appear that a legatee, distributee or beneficiary of a 
trust would not have the benefit or use or control of the money or 
other property due him, or where other special circumstances make 
47. CAL. PROB. CoDE § 259.2 (West 1956). 
48. 31 Cal. 2d 580, 191 P.2d 752 (1948). 
49. 36 Cal. 2d 159, 222 P.2d 874 (1950). See also In re Estate of Stoian, 138 
Mont. 384, 357 P.2d 41 (1960). 
50. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 45-278 (1960). 
51. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.28 (1964). 
52. Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 93, § 161 (1964). 
53. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 206, § 27A (Supp. 1966). 
54. MICR. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (306a) (1962). 
55. N.J. REv. STAT. § 3A :25-10 (1953). 
56. N.Y. SURR. CT. PRo. ACT § 2218 (McKinney 1967). This statute is a re-
enactment of section 269-a of the New York Surrogate Court Act under which all 
the cases discussed herein were decided. 
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 320.737, 1156 (Supp. 1966). 
58. Omo REv. CoDE ANN.§ 2113.81 (Baldwin 1958). 
59. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.§ 33-13-13 (1956). 
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it desirable that such payment should be withheld, the decree may 
direct that such money or other property be paid into the surrogate's 
court for the benefit of such legatee, distributee beneficiary of a trust 
or such person or persons who may thereafter appear to be entitled 
thereto. Such money or other property so paid into court shall be 
paid out only by the special order to the surrogate or pursuant to 
the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. 
The nonresident alien's absolute right to ownership is formally guar-
anteed by these statutes. Ostensibly, their purpose is to afford the alien's 
inheritance further protection. Its transmission is withheld until receipt of 
proof that conditions in his own country will allow him to have full use, 
benefit, and control of the funds. Such a procedure is thought to effectuate, 
as far as possible, the testator's intent. Although not primarily retributa-
tive measures enacted against the Communist dominated nations,60 these 
statutes, as an allegedly subordinate aim, prevent the confiscation by, and 
enrichment of, governments whose political ideologies differ from our 
own.61 An examination of the provisions of these statutes, however, leads 
to the conclusion that the latter purpose is in fact paramount. As drafted 
and applied the intent of the testator and the welfare of the nonresident 
claimant become secondary considerations. 62 
By their terms these measures are inherently vague and uncertain. 
A testator attempting to draw his will in contemplation of these statutes 
is unable to determine whether or not it shall appear that the beneficiary 
will have full use, benefit, and control or whether "other special circum-
stances make it desirable that such payment should be withheld. . . ."63 
In contrast to the reciprocity statutes which require the determination to 
be made on the basis of facts existing at the time of the testator's death, 
satisfaction of these custodial requirements must be proven whenever 
transfer of the proceeds abroad is attempted. Thus the intent of the testator 
is not seriously considered. The statutes proceed on the assumption that 
the testator would desire the beneficiary to obtain the maximum benefit 
from the bequest. Based upon this premise it is concluded that the testator 
60. In re Estate of Wells, 204 Misc. 975, 126 N.Y.S.Zd 441 (Sur. Ct. 1953). 
61. In re Estate of Uri, 7 N.J. Super. 455, 71 A.2d 665 (P. Div.), appeal dis-
missed, 5 N.J. 507, 76 A.Zd 249 (1950). 
62. Statements such as those found in First Nat'! Bank v. Fishman, 7 Ohio Misc. 
130, 217 N.E.2d 60 (1966), and Belemecich Estate, 411 Pa. 506, 192 A.2d 740 (1963).1 
rev'd sub nom., Consul General of Yugoslavia at Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania, 37:> 
U.S. 395 (1964), are frequent in the opinions. 
If this court permits the transmission of the residue of this estate to Russia, the 
Communist Government of that country will acquire the bulk of the residue by 
means of unfair currency exchange regulations, outright confiscation or otherwise, 
and the probabilities are that all or part of this money will be used to finance such 
further activities as the Berlin Wall, Korea Conflict and Viet Nam. 
First Nat'! Bank v. Fishman, supra at 133, 217 N.E.Zd at 63. 
All the known facts of a Sovietized state lead to the irresistible conclusion 
that sending American money to a person within the borders of an Iron Curtain 
country is like sending a basket of food to Little Red Ridinghood in care of 
her "grandmother." 
Belemecich Estate, supra at 511, 192 A.2d at 742. 
63. N.Y. SuRR. CT. PRo. Ac::r § 2218 (McKinney 1967). 
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would prefer that the bequest be withheld if full use, benefit, and control 
is not presently possible. An equally valid and possibly more sensible 
conclusion is that the testator would desire the legatee to receive whatever 
immediate benefit the laws of his nation allow him to derive from the 
estate share. 
When the indefinite and inconsistent methodology employed by the 
courts in implementing these statutes is considered, the task confronting 
an alien attempting to remove his estate share from this country indeed 
appears awesome. By the majority of the cases, the nonresident claimant 
bears the burden of persuading the court that he will enjoy, in his country, 
the full use, benefit, and control of the inheritance proceeds.64 The statutes 
appear to become effective at the pleasure of the court, with vast discretion 
granted to the individual judge concerning the degree of certainty to 
which the alien will be held in proving that he will have full use, benefit, 
and control. Since these statutes are precautionary measures,65 the claim-
ant must establish not only that his government has not confiscated or 
placed excessive taxes upon inheritance proceeds in the past, but also that 
it will not do so in his particular case. Numerous cases have ordered a 
withholding of the proceeds if it seems contingently possible that full use, 
benefit, and control of the funds would not be granted by the claim-
ant's government.66 
Once the court determines to invoke the statute it may take judicial 
notice of the political and economic disabilities prevalent in the alien's 
nation.67 Occasionally judicial investigation will proceed no further.68 In 
other cases, a virtually irrebuttable presumption that residents of certain 
nations will not have full use, benefit, and control of the funds arises from 
a Treasury Department directive.69 This statement prohibits the drawing 
of government checks in favor of persons residing in specified nations of 
the Communist bloc, since there is no assurance that the named payee will 
64. In re Estate of Greenberg, 46 Misc. 2d 883, 261 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sur. Ct. 
1964); In re Estate of Miller, 115 N.Y.S.2d 255 (Sur. Ct. 1952). 
65. In re Estate of Volencki, 35 N.J. Super. 351, 114 A.2d 26 (P. Div. 1955). 
66. In re Estate of Braier, 305 N.Y. 148, 111 N.E.2d 424 (1953); In re Estate 
of Reid!, 23 App. Div. 2d 171, 259 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1965); I11 re Estate of 
Weidberg, 172 Misc. 524, 15 N.Y.S.2d 252 (Sur. Ct. 1939); Berman, Soviet Heirs 
IJJ American Courts, 62 CoLUM. L. Rl<:v. 257, 263 (1962). 
67. Sobko Estate, 88 Pa. D. & C. 76, 77 (Phila. County Ct. 1954): 
Volumes have been written concerning the deplorable plight of the people 
residing in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and the other nations dominated 
by the Soviet police state. From such information as is available to us ... there 
would appear to be little doubt that these unfortunate people have been enslaved 
by a vicious government which deprives them of . . . the fundamental right of 
private ownership of property. It is fairly to be inferred ... that funds trans-
mitted to citizens of these countries are confiscated or diverted by the state or 
its officials and fail to reach the intended beneficiaries. All this is so much a 
matter of common knowledge that the auditing judge will take judicial notice 
of it .... 
The court in In re Estate of Volencki, 35 N.J. Super. 351, 114 A.2d 26 (P. Div. 1955), 
stated that the common knowledge of the obstacles in the path of such full use, benefit, 
and control should be given judicial notice. 
68. In re Estate of Volencki, 35 N.J. Super. 351, 114 A.2d 26 (P. Div. 1955). 
69. 16 Fed. Rei:". 1818 (Feb. 27, 1951). 
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receive its full value.70 In such cases, the courts refuse to consider whether 
or not transmission of the estate share through private channels would 
enable the beneficiary to enjoy its full use, benefit, and control. 
Contrary to the approach of these courts is the opinion of the New York 
appellate division in In re Estate of Reidl.71 It was held in that case that 
judicial notice of the Treasury Department directive or proof of the political 
and economic structure of the alien claimant's nation is in itself insufficient 
to warrant a withholding of the inheritance proceeds. Evidence of specific 
instances in which alien beneficiaries were deprived of full use, benefit, 
and control must be adduced before the provisions of section 269-a become 
operative. Under this rationale the burden of producing evidence is 
effectively shifted to the state. There is, however, no effective way in 
which the alien claimant can be apprised of the approach that a particular 
court will employ in his case until the final determination is made. 
The courts, in determining if the alien claimant will have full use, 
benefit, and control, occasionally attempt an evaluation of the fiscal policy 
and currency exchange rates of the nation involved.72 The series of cases 
concerning the Czechoslovakian Tuzex certificates exemplifies the contra-
dictions rampant in this area of economic evaluation. The Czechoslovakian 
government maintains a merchandising enterprise known as the Tuzex 
Foreign Trade Corporation.73 Through an outlet in this country one may 
purchase articles at the standard American price and have them delivered 
to a consignee in Czechoslovakia. Alternatively, certificates may be pur-
chased here and transmitted to the Czechoslovakian resident. These 
vouchers may be exchanged by him either for a variety of commodities 
or for the official Czechoslovakian currency at a rate higher than that 
offered for direct exchange of the American dollar. An attempt was made 
by the administrator in In re Estate of Reid[74 to convert the inheritance 
fund into these certificates and to transmit them to the heir. Refusing to 
sanction this procedure, the surrogate court stated, "[I] t appears to this 
court that the use of Tuzex gift vouchers could very well be further in-
genious attempts by Iron Curtain countries to circumvent [section] 269-a 
70. In re Estate of Markewitsh, 62 N.J. Super. 407, 163 A.2d 232 (P. Div. 
1960); In re Estate of Best, 200 Misc. 332, 107 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sur. Ct. 1951); In re 
Estate of Getream, 200 Misc. 543, 107 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Sur. Ct. 1951). 
71. 23 App. Div. 171, 259 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1965). See also In re Estate 
of Saniuk, 40 Misc. 2d 437, 243 N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sur. Ct. 1963), in which it was stated 
that proof of the treasury regulation was not the exclusive indication of the bene-
ficiary's ability to have full use, benefit, and control of the funds; other information 
may be employed by the Surrogate in reaching his conclusion. 
72. The Surrogate, prior to deciding the case In re Estate of Tybus, 28 Misc. 2d 
278, 217 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sur. Ct. 1961), visited Poland, investigated the laws, observed 
its banking system, and became familiar with its rather intricate system of foreign 
currency exchange. On the basis of this first hand experience he determined that 
the Polish heirs would have the full use, benefit, and control of their inheritances. 
73. Several other Communist countries have similar enterprises : Corecon in 
Bulgaria, discussed in In re Estate of Petroff, 49 Misc. 2d 233, 267 N.Y.S.2d 8 
(Sur. Ct. 1966); the P.K.O. Bank in Poland, discussed in In re Estate of Tybus, 28 
Misc. 2d 278, 217 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Sur. Ct. 1961). 
74. 39 Misc. 2d 805, 242 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sur. Ct. 1%3). 
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of the Surrogate's Court Act."75 The appellate division of the supreme 
court,76 in modifying the lower court's ruling, allowed transmission of the 
inheritance by means of the Tuzex certificates. It found this method to 
be in wide use, and no evidence was presented that this method had ever 
resulted in confiscation of the funds. Distribution of an estate through the 
Tuzex program was subsequently authorized on the basis of this supreme 
court opinion in In re Estate of Karman.77 But consent to a similar peti~ 
tion was denied by the surrogate court in In re Estate of Shefsick78 with 
the court determining that Tuzex certificates did not give the claimant the 
ful1 use, benefit, and control of his inheritance. Their purchasing power 
was said to be over evaluated in relation to the American dollar. This is 
concededly true, but it may be quite irrelevant. When one American dollar 
is transferred into Tuzex certificates, and these certificates are subse-
quently exchanged for Czechoslovakian crowns, the rate of exchange is 
twice as favorable as when a dollar is exchanged directly for crowns.79 
Hence by this maneuver the value of each crown in relation to the dollar 
is indeed less, since twice as many are exchanged per American dollar. 
The Czechoslovakian resident's purchasing power in his country is, how-
ever, twice as great, for every one crown he now has two. 
As a "temporary" withholding procedure, these statutes entitle an 
alien to take the estate share whenever he can establish a shift in the 
political and economic conditions which will allow him full use, benefit, and 
control of the funds.80 Since such a determination is a question of fact, 
a claimant can repeatedly institute suit employing different and more per-
suasive experts and evidence, though in fact the conditions may not 
have changed.s1 
Although allegedly preserving the alien's unqualified ownership of 
the inheritance share,82 these statutes do not confer complete use of, and 
benefit from, the funds. Until the alien meets the burden of the statute, 
the estate share is by the terms of several of these measures deposited in 
the state treasury. It is not necessarily provided, however, that the funds 
be invested in an interest bearing account with subsequent payment, with 
all accrued interest, being made to the alien upon satisfactory proof of full 
75. Id. at 807, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 107. 
76. In re Estate of Reid!, 23 App. Div. 2d 171, 259 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1965). 
77. 51 Misc. 2d 707, 273 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sur. Ct. 1966). 
78. 50 Misc. 2d 293, 270 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sur. Ct. 1966). 
79. It was stated in She/sick that at the official rate of exchange $1 could be 
exchanged for 7.14 Czechoslovakian crowns. A Tuzex certificate or crown purchased 
here for $1 could be exchanged in Czechoslovakia for 14.3 standard crowns. 
80. In re Estate of Wayland, 25 App. Div. 836, 270 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Sup. Ct. 1966). 
The lower court ordered a deposit of the funds with the state treasurer. On appeal 
the supreme court held, per curiam, that conditions in Hungary allowed an heir to 
have the full use, benefit, and control of the funds. The court in In re Estate of 
Getream, 200 Misc. 543, 107 N.Y.S.2d 225 (Sur. Ct. 1951), determined that a Hun-
garian resident would not, in 1951, have the requisite full use, benefit, and control. 
81. See In re Estate of Kuzmic, 23 Misc. 2d 604, 206 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sur. 
Ct. 1960). 
82. The court in In re Estate of Rawski, 28 Misc. 2d 253, 218 N.Y.S.2d 1111 
(Sur. Ct. 1961) released the money to the legatee, a Polish national, who was 
visiting this country. 
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use, benefit, and control in his country. The Pennsylvania statute83 directs 
that the alien will receive the principal sum with two percent interest, 
although the share might well have been more profitably invested. In 
Connecticut, the state treasurer is to invest the money at his discretion.84 
Only in Massachusetts is there a specific directive that the funds be de-
posited in a savings bank or trust account.85 Under the Maryland statute, 
the money withheld remains in the state treasury for seven years. If the 
alien is unable to successfully establish the requisite use, benefit, and con-
trol within that period, the funds are placed at the disposal of the city of 
Baltimore. A subsequent showing of the necessary proof will entitle the 
alien to a re-conveyance of the funds with, however, no interest.86 More 
drastic than the possible loss of interest are the provisions of several of 
these statutes which allow a complete forfeiture of the estate share if it is 
not authorized to be withdrawn within twenty one years.87 If the alien is 
unable to prove the full use, benefit, and control within that period, the 
estate share is divided among the other heirs or is escheated. Despite the 
statutes' guarantee of the beneficiary's right to the property, the courts in 
several cases have made an alternative disposition of the funds upon the 
initial failure of the claimant to prove use, benefit, and control.88 
A provision of the Massachusetts law89 presents the most enlightened 
variant of the use, benefit, and control statute. It provides a workable 
dialetic of any legitimate interest which the state may have in controlling 
the flow of inheritance proceeds to politically hostile nations and the intent 
of the testator and the welfare of the beneficiary. Under this law, if the 
claimant is not able to prove that he will have full use, benefit, and control 
of the inheritance proceeds, the executor of the estate may petition the 
court to have the estate share paid to him. He in turn will purchase with 
the funds food, clothing, medicine, etc., and transmit these to the beneficiary 
through a public or private agency. 
IV. DISABILITIES OF ALIENAGE STATUTES 
Although the "reciprocal rights" and the "use, benefit, and control" 
statutes are the specific types enacted to regulate inheritance, the general 
disabilities of alienage imposed by other states serve the same purpose. 
The statutes of Kentucky,90 Illinois,91 Indiana,92 Mississippi,93 and 
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.737 (Supp. 1966). 
84. CONN. Gi>N. STAT. ANN.§ 45-278 (1960). 
85. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 206, 27A (Supp. 1966). 
86. Mo. ANN. Coos art. 93, § 161(b) (1964). 
87. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 206, § 28 (1955). 
88. In re Estate of Von Der Heid, 33 Misc. 2d 812, 227 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sur. Ct. 
1958); In re Estate of Muck!, 174 Misc. 35, 19 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Sur. Ct. 1940). 
89. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 206, § 27B (Supp. 1966). 
90. KY. RJ>v. STAT. ANN.§ 381.320 (1963). 
91. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 6, §§ 1-7 (1966). 
92. IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-502 (1962). 
93. Miss. Coo~> ANN.§ 842 (1957). 
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Nebraska94 provide that an alien may initially inherit land located in 
their respective territory. Proceeding on the distrust of absentee owner-
ship of land, he is granted a specified number of years within which to 
sell the land and have the proceeds invested here or transferred abroad. 
Failure to sell within the prescribed period effects either a forced sale 
by the state or an escheat to it. In Georgia,95 Kentucky,96 and Virginia97 
the right to succeed to and hold property is conferred upon any alien who 
is a national of a country which is at peace with or not an enemy of, the 
United States. A construction of such statutes requiring the existence of 
a formal state of war would render them futile today,98 however, any 
other interpretation of the terms "enemy" and "peace" would foster political 
bias and speculation. Under the law of Kansas99 any alien eligible for 
citizenship in this country can inherit real or personal property on the 
same terms as United States citizens. Arkansas/00 Delaware,101 New 
Mexico,102 South Dakota/03 Texas,104 Utah105 and West Virginia106 
appear to unequivocally grant liens, resident and nonresident, complete 
equality of inheritance rights. 
V. FEDERAL QuESTIONS 
Several constitutional concepts must be considered in order to judge 
the validity of these repressive measures and to ascertain their current 
vitality. Their legitimacy must be justified in relation to the due process 
clause and the exclusively federal power over foreign affairs. Furthermore, 
under the supremacy clause their application is circumscribed by the federal 
treaty-making power.107 
The "reciprocity" and "use, benefit, and control" statutes are occa-
sionally attacked as being violative of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Such an assault has been successfully countered by 
several arguments. The United States Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. 
94. Nt:B. Rt:v. STAT.§ 76-402 (1958). 
95. GA. Coni> ANN.§ 73-303 (1963) (applies only to real property). 
96. KY. Rt:v. STAT. ANN.§ 381.320 (1963) (applies only to personal property). 
97. VA. Cont ANN. § 55-1 (1959) (applies only to real property). 
98. In Fehn v. Shaw, 201 Ga. 520, 40 S.E.2d 541 (1946), the Georgia Supreme 
Court held that a German National could take a legacy. The testator died in 1941, 
and as of that date the United States was not at war with Germany. 
99. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-511 (1964). In Hughes v. Kerfoot, 175 Kan. 
181, 263 P.2d 226 (1953) the concept "eligible for citizenship" was interpreted to 
encompass not only those individuals who have been approved for entrance to this 
country or for citizenship and are awaiting passage or naturalization, but also nationals 
of those countries who are capable of becoming citizens upon compliance with the 
immigration laws. 
100. ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 61-106 (1947). 
101. Dt:L. Cont: ANN. tit. 25, § 306 (1953). 
102. N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 70-1-24 (1961). 
103. S.D. CODE § 56.0120 (1939). 
104. Tt:x. Rt:v. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 166a (Supp. 1966). 
105. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 74-4-24 (1953). 
106. W. VA. Cont: ANN. § 36-1-21 (1966). 
107. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2. 
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H opkins108 stated that both clauses of the fourteenth amendment109 are 
of universal application to all individuals, citizen or alien, within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the state. This is thought to be the outer limits of the 
due process requirement. In other areas of the law, such as the regulation 
of entrance into the country, it is generally conceded that nonresident 
aliens may be subjected to severe restrictions without violation of the due 
process clause.U0 Such a rationale may be applied to inheritance by non-
resident aliens. 
Courts also have asserted, as in Estate of B evilacqua,l11 that since the 
right to inherit is purely a statutory creature it may be changed, limited, 
or abolished by legislative action. Such an argument appears to beg the 
question. It proceeds upon the dubious assumption that a statutory right, 
since it may be freely qualified, need not comply with due process standards. 
Yet, in fact, any enactment or alteration of statutory law must be justified 
against the due process requirement. The use, benefit, and control statutes 
are defended against due process attacks on the ground that there is in 
fact no taking of property, but only a temporary withholding.112 It might 
be contended that the withholding of interest payments or the eventual 
disposal of the property by alternative bequest constitutes113 a taking of 
property without due process of law.114 This argument would be countered 
with statements, as in Bevilacqua, that a state may impose any restrictions 
on the right to inherit. But the situations are critically different. The use, 
108. 118 u.s. 356,369 (1886). 
109. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. "Nor shall any state deprive any person o£ 
life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law" (emphasis added). 
110. United States ex rei. Knuff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) ; United 
States ex rei. Stellas v. Esperdy, 366 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1966). See generally Boyd, 
The Invalidity of State Statutes Governing the Share of Non Resident Aliens in 
Decedents Estates, 51 GEo. L.]. 470, 480-500 (1963). 
111. 31 Cal. 2d 580, 191 P.2d 752 (1948). 
112. Zupko Estate, 15 Pa. D.&C.Zd 442 (Phila. County Ct. 1958). See also Peti-
tion of Mazurowski, 331 Mass. 33, 116 N.E.2d 854 (1954); In re Estate of Braier, 
305 N.Y. 148, 111 N.E.Zd 424 (1953). 
113. See p. 162 and notes 85-90 supra. 
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 185 (1962) might consider such a taking of property without compensation to be 
a violation of international law. In traditional public and private international law 
this point is much disputed. See G. CHESIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (5th 
ed. 1957); A. DICEY, CoNFLICT OF LAws 11 (6th ed. 1949). 
The United States Supreme Court dismissed per curiam for want of a sub-
stantial federal question an appeal involving the constitutionality of New York's 
"Iron Curtain" statute, New York Surrogate Court Act 269-a, in Ioannou v. New 
York, 371 U.S. 30 (1962). In this case a Czechoslovakian beneficiary was unable to 
prove that she would have full use, benefit, and control of her estate share. She then 
assigned her share to a niece residing in the United Kingdom. The assignee applied 
to the Surrogate for a withdrawal of the funds. The Surrogate, the Supreme Court, 
in In re Estate of Marek, 217 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (Sup. Ct. 1961), and the Court of 
Appeals, 11 N.Y.2d 740, 181 N.E.Zd 456, 226 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1962), refused this 
Jletition finding that conditions had not changed in Czechoslovakia. Mr. Justice 
Douglas dissented from the United States Supreme Court dismissal, finding two 
federal questions. First, he questioned whether or not the New York statute might 
possibly be invalid since it conflicted with the exclusive federal power over foreign 
affairs; secondly, he asserted that refusal to recognize the assignment constituted a 
violation of due process. 
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benefit, and control statutes purport to preserve the alien's right to the 
property, whereas the reciprocity statutes condition this right. 
The constitutional validity of these statutes is also assailed on the 
grounds that they effect a forbidden intrusion into the exclusively federal 
sphere of the conduct of foreign affairs. Such an hypothesis was advanced 
by the critics of the California reciprocity statute in Clark v. AllenP5 
and the Supreme Court rejected this contention as being "farfetched."116 
At the time that this case was decided the purpose of the reciprocity 
statutes was conceded to be that evidenced by the legislative intent -
prevention of the enrichment of governments hostile to the United States.l17 
The Supreme Court recognized that the California measure would have 
some incidental and indirect effect on foreign relations, but since California 
had not attempted direct negotiation with, or a compact among, foreign 
nations, the statute was held to be constitutional. 
Subsequent cases have attributed to the reciprocity statutes a purpose 
other than that of the legislature. It is now stated that their function is to 
induce foreign nations to grant Americans inheritance rights equal to 
those enjoyed by their own citizens.118 Conceptually, this aim does con-
stitute an incursion of state action into the sphere of foreign affairs. If 
it be shown that considerations of national policy demand a unified approach 
to questions of inheritance by nonresident aliens, state action may be 
precluded by a binding decision of the Supreme Court under the concept 
of federal common law. In Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino119 the 
Supreme Court's interpretation and application of the "act of state" doc-
trine was held to be binding upon the lower courts, state and federal, as 
a matter of federal common law. It was determined that the "act of state" 
doctrine was "intrinsically federal" since diverse state construction and 
employment of the concept was detrimental to national foreign policy. 
Further, the Court was concluded to share, in conjunction with the execu-
tive and legislative branches, the power of defining and regulating foreign 
affairs.120 Should the Supreme Court take under advisement in the future 
a case involving the application of these repressive inheritance statutes, 
it could under the Sabbatino rationale, prescribe the regulation of inherit-
ance by nonresident aliens under the concept of federal common law. If 
it be concluded by the Court that the diverse treatment received by aliens 
under the various state statutes worked to the disadvantage of Americans 
attempting to share in estates probated abroad, or otherwise affected 
115. 331 u.s. 503 (1947). 
116. Id. at 517. 
117. See p. 150 and note 18 supra. 
118. E.g., Clostcrmann v. Schmidt, 215 Or. 55, 332 P.2d 1036 (1958); Comment, 
Stale Reciprocity Statutes and the Inheritance Rights of Non Resident Aliens, 1963 
DuK:.;: L.J. 315. 
119. 376 u.s. 396 (1964). 
120. See generally Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: 
Sabbatino, 64 CoLUM. L. R:.;:v. 805, 819 (1964); Comment, Judgments Rendered 
Abroad- State Law or Federal Lawr, 12 VILL. L. R!lv. 618, 621-25 (1967). 
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national foreign policy, a unitary procedure could be asserted. Such an 
approach, be it of the "reciprocity," "use, benefit, and control," or a novel 
type, would, under Sabbatino, bind the states and abrogate any conflicting 
state regulation. However, the countries to which these statutes are prin-
cipally directed are those of the Communist bloc. It may be unlikely that 
they would change their ideological concepts and laws in response to 
regulation here, and although the avowed purpose of the use, benefit, and 
control statutes is to inhibit the flow of inheritance funds to hostile nations, 
they have been held not to violate the federal power over foreign affairs.121 
The most regular contact that these repressive measures have with 
the federal prerogative is with the exclusive federal treaty-making power. 
Given the existence of treaty provisions detailing the rights of inheritance 
between the contracting parties, any conflicting state regulation must fall.122 
The Iowa Supreme Court in Corbett v. Stergios128 found that the requisite 
statutory reciprocity did not exist. A treaty existing between the United 
States and Greece124 provided that a Greek national would receive full 
inheritance rights here, but it conferred upon the Greek government 
the ability to regulate the inheritance by United States citizens of lands 
along the frontier and coast. American citizens were thus not assured 
inheritance rights in Greece equal to those enjoyed by Greek nationals. 
The Supreme Court reversed per curiam, 125 holding that the treaty sus-
pended application of the Iowa reciprocity statute and provided the ex-
clusive statement of the inheritance rights existing between Greek and 
American citizens. In Kolovrat v. Oregon126 the Supreme Court rejected 
an interpretation made by the Oregon Supreme Court127 of a treaty existing 
between the United States and Yugoslavia.128 The Oregon court had in-
terpreted the treaty provisions to apply only to resident aliens; a Yugo-
slavian in this country could inherit property here on the same terms as 
an American in Yugoslavia could inherit property there. The Supreme 
Court construed the treaty provision to encompass both resident and non-
resident aliens, and authorized the transmission of inheritance proceeds 
to a resident of Yugoslavia. The provision of the Oregon statute requir-
ing proof that an American will have the absolute right to withdraw pro-
121. Ioannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30 (1962); In re Estate of Braier, 346 U.S. 
802 (1953). 
122. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) ; Estate of Arbulich, 41 Cal. 2d 86, 257 
P.2d 433, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953) ; Guiseppe v. Cozzani, 238 Miss. 273, 118 
So. 2d 189 (1960); Zschernig v. Miller, 243 Or. 567, 412 P.2d 781 (1966). See 
generally Boyd, Treaties Governing The Succession to Real Property by Aliens, 51 
Mrcn. L. Rev. 1001 (1953) ; Meekison, Treaty Provisions for The Inheritance of 
Personal Property, 44 AM. ]. !NT'L L. 313 (1950). 
123. 256 Iowa 12, 126 N.W.2d 342 (1964). 
124. 5 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057. 
125. Corbett v. Stergios, 381 U.S. 124 (1965). 
126. 366 u.s. 187 (1961). 
127. Stoich v. Kolovrat, 220 Or. 448, 349 P.2d 255 (1960). The Oregon court in 
its interpretation relied heavily on Estate of Arbulich, 41 Cal. 2d 86, 257 P.2d 433, 
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 897 (1953). 
128. 62 Stat. 2658, T.I.A.S. 1803. 
FALL 1967] CoMMENTS 167 
ceeds from an estate probated abroad1211 was held to be in violation of the 
spirit of the treaty. The currency restrictions imposed by the Yugo-
slavian government were thought by the Court to be in accord with the 
policy of an international agreement to which both the United States and 
Yugoslavia were parties.130 It was held by the Court that the restriction 
of the Oregon statute must yield to such expressed policies. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court in Belemecich Estate131 held that there was no incon-
sistency between the treaty interpreted in K olovrat and the requirements 
of the use, benefit, and control statutes. Both assure the right of a Yugo-
slavian national to inherit in this country; the use, benefit, and control 
statute merely imposes an additional requirement. Although the United 
States Supreme Court reversed Belemecich,132 the Pennsylvania court in 
the subsequent case of W anson Estate133 stated that this reversal did not 
affect its former decision. The New York Surrogate Court, however, 
in the case of In re Estate of Primorac134 held the Supreme Court inter-
pretation of the treaty in Kolovrat to suspend application of its use, benefit, 
and control statute. 
Occasionally an alien will claim protection of a treaty concluded be-
tween the United States and a government no longer controlling the 
geographic region in which he resides. Numerous cases have held that 
residents of the China mainland135 or East Germany136 are not covered 
by treaties concluded between the United States and the Republic of China 
or the German Republic. Such individuals must, therefore, prove com-
pliance with the statutory requirements. Contrary to the rationale of 
these cases is the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in Hanafin 
v. M cCarthy137 which held that a treaty between the United States and 
the United Kingdom should continue to regulate inheritance by residents 
of the more recently formed Irish Free State.188 
129. OR!l. R!lv. STAT. 111.070(lb) (1965). 
130. The International Monetary Fund (Bretton Woods) Agreement of 1945, 
60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. 1501. The Supreme Court in its interpretation of the Treaty 
with Yugoslavia, and the policies of the Bretton Woods Agreement, gave great weight 
to the meanings given them by the executive department. 366 U.S. at 194. See 
R!lsTAT!lM!lNT (S!lcoNn) FoR!liGN R!lLATIONS LAw oF TH!l UNIT!lD STAT!lS § 152 
(1962). 
The California Court in Estate of Arbulich, 41 Cal. 2d 86, 257 P.2d 433, 
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 897 (1953), stated that although the interpretation of a treaty 
is a matter of law, evidence of its construction and application by the other contracting 
party is a question of fact. However, the Oregon Supreme Court in In re Kasendorf's 
Estate, 222 Or. 463, 353 P.2d 531 (1960) assumed that a treaty statement would be 
considered as the supreme law of the land by the other nation. 
131. 411 Pa. 506, 192 A.2d 740 (1963). 
132. Consul General of Yugoslavia at Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania, 375 U.S. 395 
(1964). 
133. 419 Pa. 109 n.7, 213 A.2d 631 n.7 (1965). 
134. 51 Misc. 2d 166,272 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sur. Ct. 1966). 
135. Estate of Eng, 228 Cal. App. 2d 162, 39 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1964); In re Estate of 
Ycc Yoke Ban, 200 :Misc. 332, 107 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sur. Ct. 1951); In re Estate of 
Wong Hoen, 199 Misc. 1119, 107 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Sur. Ct. 1951). 
136. Zschcrnig v. Miller, 243 Or. 567, 412 P.2d 781 (1966). 
137. 95 N.H. 36, 57 A.2d 148 (1948). 
138. See generally O'Connell, State S11ccession and Problems of Treaty Interpre-
tation, 58 AM. J. lNT"L L. 41 (1964). 
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VI. CoNCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion evidences the inconsistent and contradictory 
procedures imposed by these repressive measures upon an alien attempting 
to claim an inheritance share. It further demonstrates the frustration 
which they may work on the testamentary scheme of the decedent and the 
confusion in estate administration which they may precipitate. 
The statutory requirements of both the "reciprocal rights" and the 
"use, benefit, and control" measures must be proven as questions of fact. 
The inapplicability of stare decisis is advantageous to an alien under the 
adjective law "use, benefit, and control" statutes since it enables him to 
repeatedly institute suit. Contrarily, the reciprocity statutes substantially 
condition the claimant's right to the inheritance upon satisfactory proof of 
compliance with the statutory scheme on the initial attempt, and the 
claimant unqualifiedly bears the burden of proof. The use, benefit, and 
control statutes, however, appear to sanction the individual court's discre-
tionary allocation of the burden of proof and determination of the degree 
of certainty necessary to meet this burden. Excuse for this vague and 
unsettled procedure may be offered on the grounds that suit may be rein-
stituted. However, when the loss of interest and possible forfeiture of 
the funds, as well as the increased cost of reinstitution of suit, are recalled 
such equivocal methodology seems totally unjustified. 
Even though a testator is presumed to have drawn his will in cogniz-
ance of these statutes, the intent evidenced by his testamentary scheme is 
often overlooked or frustrated by their application. This is exemplified 
by the bifurcated and contradictory approach of the courts under the re-
ciprocity statutes. Assuming the failure of the named beneficiary to prove 
the requisite reciprocity, it is not unreasonable to believe that the testator 
wills the estate share to pass by succession to his other heirs. It is a 
strained and unwarranted assumption that he intends and wills an absolute 
escheat upon such a failure. The "use, benefit, and control" statutes gratui-
tously assume that the testator wills the funds be held in abeyance until 
political and economic factors permit their maximum enjoyment, a con-
dition which the testator may well believe will not exist within his bene-
ficiary's lifetime. The alternative disposition of the funds or their eventual 
escheat are made in complete derogation of both the intent of the testator 
and the formal guarantee of ownership which these statutes provide. 
Realizing that real property passes by the law of the state in which it 
is situated, and personal property by the law of the probating state, these 
various forms of repressive statutes necessarily give rise to increased ex-
pense and hardship on estate administration. Should a will probated in a 
state employing a "use, benefit, and control" statute contain a bequest to 
a nonresident alien of land located in a "reciprocity" state, the alien, in 
order to receive the proceeds from the sale of such land, would be forced 
to comply with both statutory schemes. The attendant expense of two 
court determinations may often be prohibitive. 
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The plight imposed upon the alien by these conflicting requirements 
is not likely to be soon alleviated. There is no movement among the states 
toward adoption of a uniform procedure, and the Supreme Court has 
consistently termed all these regulations legitimate state action. Should 
the Supreme Court determine that the diverse procedures and holdings 
extant under the state laws run counter to national foreign policy con-
siderations, it could extend the concept of federal common law to encom-
pass the inheritance rights of nonresident aliens and adopt a uniform 
procedure which would be binding on the states. However, the most effec-
tive method of countering the effect of these statutes appears to be treaties 
which precisely delineate the inheritance rights to be enjoyed by nationals 
of the contracting parties. 
Daniel T. Murphy 
